2013
03.06

VOID ORDERS CAN BE ATTACKED AT ANY TIME IN ANY COURT PROVIDED THAT PARTY IS PROPERLY BEFORE COURT

No Notice, No Jurisdiction, No Authority to Grant Relief, and the Judgment is VOID!

“It is fundamental that no judgment or order affecting the rights of a party to the cause shall be made or rendered without notice to the party whose rights are to be affected.” Tyron Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Phelps, 307 S.C. 361, 362, 415 S.E.2d 397, 398 (1992). Generally, a person against whom a judgment or order is taken without notice may rightly ignore it and may assume that no court will enforce it against his person or property. Id.
See Stuck v. Medical Examiners, 94 Ca 2d 751. 211 P2d 389. “Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be assumed, it must be proven to exist.” See also Joyce v. US, 474 F2d 215., “There is no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction.” See also Rosemond V. Lambert, 469 F2d 416., The burden shifts to the courts to prove jurisdiction.

If a court grants relief, which under the circumstances it hasn’t any authority to grant, its judgment is to that extent void.” (1 Freeman on Judgments, 120-c.) An illegal order is forever void.

1. Four Factors to Determine whether a Judge’s Act is a “Judicial” One

To determine whether a judge’s act is a “judicial” one, the Court is to consider four factors: (1) whether the act complained of is one normally performed by a judge; (2) whether the act occurred in the courtroom or an appropriate adjunct such as the judge’s chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the judge; and (4) whether the act arose out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.” Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1124 (5th Cir.1993).

(1) whether the act complained of is one normally performed by a judge: Rainey’s imposing on this indigent Plaintiff the Clerk’s duties to “issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such cases” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(d), and refusing to reinstate the complaints dismissed sua sponte under Rule 1-041(E)(2) of Rules Enabling Act, which is mandatory, are not acts normally performed by a judge.

(2) whether the act occurred in the courtroom or an appropriate adjunct such as the judge’s chambers: The acts neither occurred in the courtroom nor an appropriate adjunct such as the judge’s chambers because without service of process, no parties were present, and there was no subject matter before the judge for adjudication;

(3) whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the judge: Since there was neither subject matter nor personal jurisdiction, there was no controversy that centered around any case pending before the judge and

(4) whether the act arose out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity: The decision was made in his administrative, ministerial, non-judicial, non-adjudicative, personal, private-citizen capacity. Without subject matter and parties before him, whatever he did was not done in his judicial, but personal, capacity.

2. There are only two circumstances when a judge is not entitled to judicial immunity: (1) when he performs acts not in his judicial capacity and (2) when he performs act, although judicial in nature, in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991). Here, Judge Rainey is not entitled to judicial immunity because (1) when he rendered the Order to Dismiss without prejudice, he was not performing acts in his judicial capacity; he was making an administrative, ministerial, non-judicial, non-adjudicative decision; and (2) when he performs act, although judicial in nature, in the complete absence of all jurisdiction: neither subject matter nor personal jurisdiction was present; he was without any authority to hear the case and determine any issue. Neither is Judge Jack entitled to judicial or absolute immunity because without service of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915 (d) while the indigent Plaintiff was proceeding in forma pauperis, she was in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.

3. Congress meant to provide individuals immediate access to the federal courts. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).

4. By rendering VOID Orders/Judgments, both judicial officers denied this indigent Plaintiff immediate access to the federal courts, and were acting as private citizens stripped of their black robes, authority, and immunity.

5. In addition, they committed fraud upon the court. “Fraud upon the court” has been defined as that fraud committed by an officer of the court in any attempt to deceive, either by commission, by omission, by speech, by silence, by gesture, by innuendo, by look, etc. Whenever this fraud is committed in a court of law by any attorney or judge, it is a “fraud upon the court”. In re Eugene Lee Armentrout et al., 99 Ill.2d 242, 75 Ill.Dec. 703, 457 N.E.2d 1262 (1983); Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 68 Ill.2d 419, 435, 12 Ill.Dec. 151, 369 N.E.2d 858 (1977); In re Lamberis, 93 Ill.2d 222, 229, 66 Ill.Dec. 623, 443 N.E.2d 549 (1982); Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (1985); Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 169 F.2d 514 (1948).

6. “Fraud upon the court” has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to “embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication.” Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore’s Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated “a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final.”

7. Since a “fraud upon the court” vitiates the entire case, all the VOID Orders/Judgments rendered by the federal and state courts must be stricken as orders from the court, as none of the courts held subject-matter jurisdiction. No court has the lawful authority to validate a void order. U.S.v. Throckmorton, 98U.S.61,25 L.Ed. 93 (1878); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct. 997 (1943); Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co.,169 F.2d 514 (1948); In re Garcia, 109 B.R. 335 (N.D. Illinois, 1989); Schwarz v. Schwarz, 27 Ill.2d 140, 188 N.E.2d 673 (1963); Dunham v. Dunham, 162 Ill. 614 (1896); Skelly Oil v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App.79, 87 (1st Dist. 1949).

8. Consequently, all the officers of the court, including judges and attorneys that committed fraud upon the various courts, state and federal, are personally liable to the victims for damages.

9. I urge my fellow victims in similar situations to fight back because VOID Orders/Judgments must be set aside:

(1) A “void” judgment, as we all know, grounds no rights, forms no defense to actions taken thereunder, and is vulnerable to any manner of collateral attack (thus here, by). No statute of limitations or repose runs on its holdings, the matters thought to be settled thereby are not res judicata, and years later, when the memories may have grown dim and rights long been regarded as vested, any disgruntled litigant may reopen old wound and once more probe its depths. And it is then as though trial and adjudication had never been. Fritts v. Krugh, Supreme Court of Michigan, 92 N.W.2d 604, 354 Mich. 97 (10/13/58).

(2) Void order which is one entered by court which lacks jurisdiction over parties or subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter judgment, or order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that party is properly before court, People ex. re. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App.2 Dist. 1994).

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