“Grave abuse of discretion is a concept that defies exact definition, but generally refers to ‘capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction’; the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave.

Use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision maker’s action with grave abuse of discretion.”

What does ‘grave’ mean? As applied to public officers, and as a ground for disciplinary action, grave misconduct refers to such misconduct which shows the elements of (a) corruption, (b) clear intent to violate the law, or (c) flagrant disregard of established rule (Landrito v. CSC, 223 SCRA 564, [1993]).

Mandamus, like prohibition, is not a substitute for appeal. The unenvious prospect of maintaining an action through a lengthy appeal
process does not entitle the relator to such an extraordinary writ. Requirements for the issuance of a writ of mandamus are similar to
those needed for a writ of prohibition. The court must find that the relator has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, that the respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the requested act, and that relator has no plain and adequate remedy at law.
(1) deliberate indifference;
(2) gross negligence or arbitrariness that indeed shocks the conscience; or
(3) intent to cause harm.”

Frivolous Lawsuits and Legal Definitions
Frivolous lawsuits are those filed by a party or attorney who is aware they are without merit, because of a lack of supporting legal argument or factual basis for the claims. Frivolous lawsuits waste time, money, and judicial resources, and fines and/or sanctions may be imposed upon a party or their attorney for filing such a claim.

Frivolous lawsuits are those filed for purposes of harassment or coercion, such as to coerce the defendant into paying more or accepting less money than is rightfully due. They may be filed due to lack of due diligence by an attorney in investigating a client’s claim, or other reasons. Generally, the defendant must win the lawsuit before seeking a remedy for the frivolous claim.

Either by United States Constitution or the state constitution, either one, The oath creates moral obligation and perjury of oath of office is a felony.

Lawyers face a difficult ethical choice when confronted with a lying client. They can avoid the ethical dilemma altogether by turning a blind eye to the client perjury or, worse yet, by encouraging and facilitating false testimony from their clients.

One of the reasons they’ll go after the children is to destabilize people emotionally. It’s not only that it will exhaust you financially. Once they destabilize you emotionally, you become unfit to handle your own case. They can even drive you into depression. They can get you screaming and shouting so even your supporters abandon you because you’re too crazy to deal with.

You understand it perfectly. They bankrupt you. They take your property. They take your children. They really don’t leave you with much of anything.
And they won’t leave you with half. If they target you they’ll take it all because, after they’ve gutted you, they don’t want you to have any resources
left to hire professional help to launch a counter-attack or an appeal.

In other words, if a single judge commits unlawful acts from the bench, he can easily hide behind his personal immunity. But if it can be shown that
that judge is working in association with other judges, then just like a conspiracy, there is not only no collective immunity, there’s no personal immunity either?

Exactly. They have immunity for what they do individually inside a court, but what they do outside — taking bribes and collectively setting up cases in their associations they have no immunity whatsoever because their “corporations” or associations have no immunity.

There’s the old cliche’, “All power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely.” But “absolute power” is the working definition of judicial immunity.
If you can‘t try me for anything I do, then I have virtually absolute power — I can do virtually anything I want and get away with it.

“There are three things needed to give jurisdiction: First, power by law to act upon the general subject-matter …. Second, jurisdiction of the person… Third, jurisdiction of the particular case.”‘

A court, acting without jurisdiction of subject-matter, could, as between the parties, arrive at no valid conclusion.
Similarly, as to a court lacking jurisdiction of persons, where such jurisdiction was required.
And, in any event, even the power to decide questions of jurisdiction, presupposes a minimum showing of facts to justify even the initiation of the process of judging.

A court has jurisdiction of subject-matter, when it has the right to adjudicate between given individuals with respect to the field of rights in which the contioversy arises. Similarly, a court has jurisdiction of persons when it has the right to adjudicate, within such field of rights, with respect to the persons who are before the court. And there is still a third conception of jurisdiction, i.e., contemplating the power of the court to decide whether or not it has jurisdiction of subject-matter and jurisdiction of persons. Obviously, as between the parties to a litigation, judicial proceedings are void, if lacking in jurisdiction of subjectmatter, or of persons (where such jurisdiction is necessary). It cannot be important to them that the court had power to decide its own jurisdiction, and was wrong. Nothing less than actual jurisdiction will do; similarly, as to the rights of those whose civil rights depend upon the validity of the adjudication thus made. That the court was wrong on any of the issues in the case, other than jurisdiction,, is immaterial. But as to jurisdiction, the court must have been right.

It is not the actual jurisdiction of the judge, but the presence of sufficient facts requiring him to pass on his own jurisdiction, which affords the subjective test for his own immunity,
When a judge has been provided the facts sufficiently indicative of lack of jurisdiction, and knows that his actions lack jurisdiction and acts anyway, immunity does not apply. His personal acts were Coram Non Judice.

Coram non judice is a Latin phrase which means “not in the presence of a judge”. It is a legal term typically used to indicate a legal proceeding held without a judge, with improper venue such as before a court which lacks the authority to hear and decide the case in question, or without proper jurisdiction.

An assertion of judicial jurisdiction beyond the proper limits of jurisdiction is a deprivation of property without due process of law.

Judicial action beyond the preconceptions of jurisdiction is void with a vengeance.

• “lack of jurisdiction over the person” under Rule 12(b)(2), which is
read to cover all of the defense of lack of territorial jurisdiction;
• “improper venue” under Rule 12(b)(3);
• “insufficiency of process” under Rule 12(b)(4), which covers defects in
the form of the summons; and
• “insufficiency of service of process” under Rule 12(b)(5), which covers
defects in the manner of transmitting notice

1. Procedural Settings for Decision on Jurisdiction
To flesh out the definition and implications of the prima facie standard of proof, one must first examine the procedural settings in which the jurisdictional issue will arise.
By bringing any action, the plaintiff asserts, at least implicitly, that the court has jurisdiction and is a proper venue, and that the plaintiff will properly notify the defendant.

But sooner or later, the defendant may dispute the plaintiff’s position and so create a contested issue.

In the ordinary course of the initial action, the defendant can challenge the plaintiff’s implicit or explicit assertions of forum authority, but must do so by raising any personal defense early and in a way that avoids waiver.

If the defendant does raise any of the forum-authority defenses, the court must pass on them. So much for the burden of allegation. The burdens of production and persuasion on these threshold issues will be on the plaintiff.,

The parties receive a reasonable opportunity for discovery on any reasonably contestable issue of forum authority.

The judge may (1) hear and determine the defense in a pretrial proceeding on the application of any party or (2) choose to defer the issue until trial.

The judge determines the issue on documentary proof and affidavits and, if necessary, after an evidentiary hearing.

An affirmative finding on contested jurisdictional facts by a prima facie standard will not affect the merits, because facts found by a lower standard of proof will not preclude issues governed by a higher standard of proof; but a finding of jurisdiction will preclude later relief from judgment for lack of jurisdiction, by the ordinary operation of the jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction doctrine.

Alternatively, under existing law, a finding of no jurisdiction does not produce a valid judgment and so should not be binding in another action, except to defeat jurisdiction in any attempt to sue again in a court where the same jurisdictional issue arises.

Courts should afford the fuller procedures, allowing discovery and an evidentiary hearing if necessary to apply properly the consistently applicable standard of proof.

Alternatively, the court may choose to defer decision under that same standard until such time as those fuller procedures become efficient to employ, perhaps at trial on the merits, although courts should be somewhat reluctant to postpone because delay can unfairly and awkwardly force the defendant to litigate in a place that turns out to lack personal jurisdiction.

A court might find jurisdiction to exist prima facie on a pretrial motion, then go on to rule on other motions and hold a trial, and finally decide that jurisdiction does not exist by a preponderance. This way of opening an affirmative jurisdictional determination to reconsideration at trial under a higher standard of proof would undermine the policies behind Steel Co.’s first-things-first rule, because by then a court without jurisdiction will have taken many steps.

Also worrisome would be any judicial inclination to vary the standard of proof with the defendant’s chosen time for challenging jurisdiction (i.e., special appearance at the outset or later relief from judgment, whether by direct or collateral attack). On special appearance, on a pretty light showing the court might incline to say that the plaintiff has made a sufficient showing to proceed to the merits, when the defendant will have an opportunity to continue trying to defeat the plaintiff’s claim. On collateral attack, the court might instead incline to indulge the defaulting defendant when deciding the jurisdictional contest, raising the standard for the plaintiff’s proof and so enabling the defendant to maintain that the plaintiff had wrongly sued this defendant in that first forum; there is a certain appeal to letting the defendant demonstrate, say, that a hallucinating plaintiff fabricated a story to sue the upright defendant in an abusive forum.

Nevertheless, the law shifts the burden of proof to the defendant on subsequent attack, so it seems to reject any urge to indulge a collaterally attacking defendant.

Moreover, a higher standard for the plaintiff on collateral attack by the defendant would open the door a bit to
collateral attack after special-appearance-then-default, because the defendant could argue that the earlier finding under the lower standard
of proof is not preclusive.

It should not be that a plaintiff can get to trial by a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, but once at trial must show both jurisdiction and liability by a preponderance. As I have explained, the delayed jump in the jurisdictional standard of proof would have forced winning defendants to defend on the merits where by law it turns out they did not have a true obligation to defend, and it would also risk imposing on those defendants a jurisdictional dismissal after what would have been a successful defense on the merits unless they can then consent to jurisdiction.

A judge, whose acts are void for lack of jurisdiction, may, nevertheless, be immune from legal responsibility because, in fact, he had sufficient
jurisdiction for that purpose; and, furthermore, because that which is void, as between the parties to a litigation, may still be valid as against
third parties; and, finally, because whether or not a judge shall be responsible for his void acts, may depend on whether he purported to act in a court of general or limited jurisdiction.

Obviously, as between the parties to a litigation, judicial proceedings are void, if lacking in jurisdiction of subjectmatter, or of persons where such jurisdiction is necessary). It cannot be important to them that the court had power to decide its own jurisdiction, and was wrong. Nothing less than actual jurisdiction will do; similarly, as to the rights of those whose civil rights depend upon the validity of the adjudication thus made. That the court was wrong on any of the issues in the case, other than jurisdiction,, is immaterial. But as to jurisdiction, the court must have been right.

This leads us, then, to the inquiry as to what is the irreducible minimum which must appear to justify the initiation of the judicial process. Unfortunately, there is no accurate measure. All that can be said is that such facts must appear as to justify belief, on the part of a reasonable judicial officer, that he is called upon to exercise his judicial function, and should not shirk it.

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